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LIBEL, PRIVACY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Lois G. FORERt
The Western world was shocked by Ayatollah Khomeini's
call for the assassination of author, Salman Rushdie, whose
novel, Satanic Verses, allegedly slandered the prophet Muham-
mad. The book was not published or distributed in any Islamic
countries. A high British official has called Rushdie's book
blasphemous and suggested that the moribund statute penaliz-
ing blasphemy be amended to include remarks offensive to any
religion.
Recently, the Thatcher government of Britain prosecuted,
some say persecuted, Peter Wright, a former British secret ser-
vice agent who wrote a book, Spycatcher, critical of the govern-
ment. Publication was banned in England.
Writers and politicians in Europe and the United States have
tergiversated in responding to these assaults on freedom of ex-
pression. Civil libertarians in Britain suggest that what that na-
tion needs is the equivalent of our first amendment.
Certainly a provision in the basic charter of government pro-
tecting freedom of expression is highly desirable but it is not
an impregnable shield against omnipresent attempts to muz-
zle, punish, or obtain money from those who express views
that others find inimical. Lest any American be lulled into be-
lieving that the first amendment provides a guaranty of free-
dom of speech and of the press, let me call your attention to a
few of the successful attacks on the first amendment that have
been upheld by the United States Supreme Court in recent'
years. Former CIA agent Frank W. Snepp III, who wrote a
book about his experiences in the agency, had his royalties
confiscated.' Britain at least allowed Wright to keep the earn-
ings on his book from sales in other countries.
t Retired Judge, Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Mem-
ber of the Libel Reform Project of the Annenberg Washington Program. Judge
Forer's latest book, A CHILLING EFFECT: THE MOUNTING THREAT OF LIBEL AND INVA-
SION OF PRIVACY ACTIONS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT, was published in 1987.
This article was presented as a speech at the annual William Mitchell Law Review
banquet in April 1989.
1. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
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Philip Agee, another former CIA agent, had his passport
lifted for making critical remarks about government policy.2
Samuel Loring Morison, a military intelligence employee, was
convicted under the Espionage Act for mailing photos of a So-
viet aircraft carrier to Jane's Defence Weekly, a highly respected
British publication.3 Ralph Ginzburg was convicted and im-
prisoned for publishing journals that were admittedly not ob-
scene. However, the Supreme Court inferred a salacious
intent from the fact that these journals were mailed from post
offices in towns named "Blue Ball" and "Intercourse". 4 Only
this year, 1989, the Court upheld against a first amendment
challenge to the applicability of the Indiana RICO statute to
adult bookstores even though sale of obscene materials is only
a misdemeanor. The Court did set aside an ex parte order au-
thorizing seizure of all realty and personalty of the defend-
ants.5 Our government sought to enjoin the Progressive, a
Wisconsin magazine, from printing material taken from the
public library. 6 It cost the Progressive a third of its income to
fight this suit which was ultimately dropped.
After the Supreme Court lifted the injunction against publi-
cation of the Pentagon Papers, 7 most Americans thought that
freedom of expression and the first amendment had been se-
cured. I suggest that this assurance is unfounded. Court sanc-
tions and violations of freedom of expression continue. The
most recent spate of actions have not been brought by the gov-
ernment but by private parties who have resurrected the old
common law of libel as a weapon not only to vindicate hurt
feelings but also to obtain large sums of money from the me-
dia, unwary individuals and corporations.
By misreading legal history and indulging in wishful think-
ing, most Americans continue to believe that they are pro-
tected when expressing their opinions. All too often they find
that they are defendants in costly libel suits. One of the most
2. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
3. United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 259 (1988).
4. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 467 (1966), reh'g denied, 384 U.S.
934 (1966).
5. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916 (1989).
6. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 5, 5-6 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
7. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
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shocking is the case of McDonald v. Smith.8 Smith wrote a letter
to President Reagan with respect to the pending appointment
of McDonald to the sensitive position of United States Attor-
ney. The letters were very derogatory. McDonald did not get
the appointment and sued for libel. The Supreme Court up-
held a substantial verdict against Smith who thought he was
exercising two important rights--one, to express his opinion
on a matter of public interest and two, to petition the govern-
ment. Neither argument prevailed.
Although I am not a proponent of the theory of original in-
tent in judicial interpretation, it is instructive to look at what
the framers of the first amendment had to say about their in-
tentions. The language of this oft cited charter of liberty is
clear and absolute. A nonlawyer might logically conclude that
there is no room for interpretation. It reads in pertinent part,
"Congress shall make no law . . .abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press. ... " If this were not clear enough, we
have James Madison's own gloss on the provision. He wrote,
"The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to
speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom
of the press as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be
inviolable."' 0 Neither clarity of language nor unmistakable ev-
idence of the intent of the founding fathers, however, has suf-
ficed to secure free speech and freedom of the press in the
United States.
From time to time we take heart from a favorable decision
and assume that the danger is over. But as John Philpot Cur-
ran declared in 1790, "The condition upon which God hath
given liberty to man is eternal vigilance. .. "
In 1735, as every school child knows, John Peter Zenger was
prosecuted for libel for publishing an article critical of the Brit-
ish colonial governor of New York. Thanks to the skill of the
great Philadelphia lawyer, Andrew Hamilton, the jury failed to
convict Zenger who was ultimately released from prison. This
crime was known as seditious libel. Under the law as it was
then, truth was no defense to libel. Although this case has
stood for freedom of the press in America, in fact, it had no
real effect on the law. For the next two centuries, the crime of
8. 472 U.S. 479 (1985).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
10. I ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (J.Gales ed. 1789).
1989]
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seditious libel flourished in the colonies and under the Consti-
tution. Countless editors and publishers who criticized the
government or government officials were prosecuted, tried,
convicted and imprisoned for seditious libel. As recently as
the early part of this century, in Patterson v. Colorado," the
United States Supreme Court upheld a conviction for con-
tempt against an editor who had criticized the Colorado
Supreme Court. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, grafted
onto the first amendment a severe limitation. He held that this
guaranty of freedom of expression was limited to prohibiting
only prior restraint of publication. After an article was pub-
lished the author and publisher could be punished for con-
tempt, as in this case, or be held responsible for libel.
A decade later in the famous, or infamous, Schenck case, 12 the
Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the Secretary of the
Socialist Party, a legal entity, for printing and mailing pam-
phlets opposing the first World War. In that decision, again
written by justice Holmes, another exception was carved out of
the first amendment, the clear and present danger test. With a
facile but irrelevant aphorism Holmes declared, "No one has a
right to shout fire in a crowded theater."' 13 But Schenck was
not in a theater, crowded or empty. He did not shout fire. He
printed a little pamphlet expressing his opinion of the war.
Without a scintilla of evidence that anyone had read the pam-
phlet or been influenced by it, Holmes held that its publication
made recruitment for the armed forces more difficult. Even if
such had been proved, it requires a suspension of logic to find
that such a publication constituted a clear and present danger
to the United States. Nonetheless, the Schenck case has been
cited for generations as a milestone in the protection of first
amendment rights.
The following term, in Abrams v. United States, 14 the Supreme
Court made the astonishing declaration that "sedition libel is
dead." One might have thought that seditious libel died in
1800 with the expiration of the infamous Alien and Sedition
Act.
That position has been taken at face value for more than half
11. 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
12. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
13. Id. at 52.
14. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
(Vol. 15
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a century. But even a cursory reading of the Abrams case dis-
closes that Abrams was convicted of conspiring to violate the
Espionage Act by printing "disloyal, scurrilous, and abusive
language" about the United States and the war effort.
Although the crime charged was conspiracy, in fact, Abrams
was convicted for a publication that clearly falls within the defi-
nition of seditious libel.
During the McCarthy era in another astonishing opinion,
Dennis v. United States,' 5 the Supreme Court denied freedom of
speech even though there was no evidence that the speech
constituted a "clear and present danger."
In 1964, the Supreme Court decided New York Times v. Sulli-
van. 16 This decision was also hailed as an extraordinary ad-
vance in the protection of first amendment rights. Professor
Alexander Meiklejohn, a leading civil libertarian, declared, "It
is an occasion for dancing in the streets." Even though the
Court held contrary to centuries of precedent that libel of pub-
lic officials was within the ambit of the protection of the first
amendment, a look at the decision and its progeny would indi-
cate to most persons who value that constitutional provision
that his elation was premature and unfounded.
Criticizing supposedly liberal decisions of the Supreme
Court is not an activity that is designed to help a lawyer win
friends and influence people in the legal and academic estab-
lishments. Significantly, when in 1960, Professor Leonard
Levy published Legacy of Suppression,17 a scholarly study highly
critical of the Supreme Court's decisions in the area of free
speech, he was urged by many academicians not to release the
book because of the harm to free speech that they envisioned
the book would cause. The reissuance of a revised version of
the book in 198518 met with a better reception.
Perhaps the change in academic climate has occurred be-
cause of the spate of decisions following New York Times v. Sulli-
van. It must also be noted that members of the high court
themselves have been savage in their criticisms of the Sullivan
case. Nothing I could say can equal their vituperation. For ex-
15. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
16. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
17. L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960).
18. LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION was reissued under the title EMERGENCE OF A FREE
PRESS.
19891
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ample, Justice Black wrote in 1967, "No one, including this
Court, can know what is and what is not constitutionally ob-
scene or libelous under this Court's rulings."' 9 Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, in a dissenting opinion
in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., noted: "With-
out explaining what is a 'matter of public concern,' the plural-
ity opinion proceeds to serve up a smorgasbord of reasons why
the speech at issue here is not. ... "20
It is Worth a few moments to look at the Sullivan case and see
what the Court really decided. This was a libel action brought
by the sheriff of Montgomery County Alabama against the New
York Times. An Alabama jury awarded Sullivan $500,000. The
verdict was upheld by the Alabama Supreme Court. The
United States Supreme Court reversed. As in most libel cases,
the allegedly defamatory statement in the Sullivan case was not
in dispute. On March 29, 1960, the New York Times published
an advertisement by the Committee to Defend Martin Luther
King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South. The adver-
tisement listed the names of the officers of the committee and
its address, and asked for financial contributions.2 1 L.B. Sulli-
van, the plaintiff, was a commissioner of the City of Montgom-
ery, Alabama, whose duties included supervision of the police
department. He was not mentioned by name in the advertise-
ment, but he claimed that mention of the police referred to
him. Moreover, out of ten paragraphs in the advertisement;
only the third and a part of the sixth paragraphs were the basis
of Sullivan's claim of libel.
Although some of the statements contained in the two
paragraphs were not accurate descriptions of events which oc-
curred in Montgomery, these inaccuracies did not substantially
alter the facts or change the gravamen of the complaint. If the
advertisement had correctly reported that Dr. King had been
arrested four times instead of seven, as the advertisement
stated, Sullivan would still have had the same legal claims. The
Court also pointed out that the Committee paid $4,800 for the
advertisement and that approximately 394 copies of the edi-
tion of the newspaper containing the advertisement were circu-
19. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 171 (1967).
20. 472 U.S. 749, 785 (1985) (emphasis in original).
21. A copy of the advertisement is attached at the end of the majority's decision.
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964).
[Vol. 15
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lated in Alabama. Of these, thirty-four copies were distributed
in Montgomery County. The total circulation of the New York
Times on that day was approximately 650,000 copies.
Sullivan did not claim that he had suffered any pecuniary
damage. Under the common law, that was not necessary.
There were many legal grounds on which the verdict could
have been reversed without raising the constitutional issue of
the first amendment rights. The Court might have held that
the press is not responsible for the content of a paid advertise-
ment that is not scandalous or libelous on its face. The print-
ing of an advertisement or the reporting of a statement by
another as a news item, even though libelous, could have been
held to be privileged. The contrary view would require the
press to censor advertisements and refrain from reporting
newsworthy comments. The tortured identification of Sullivan
with the actions of the police was unnecessary. The Court
could have held that the advertisement was not "of and con-
cerning" him. Under such a reading Sullivan would have had
no standing to complain. The Court might also have held that,
given the temper of the times in Montgomery, Alabama, the
statement did not hold Sullivan up to contumely and ridicule
in his community, the test of defamation. He might also have
been held to be libel-proof with respect to this statement.
Two other well-established principles of general law also
militated against the verdict. The award was clearly excessive
and could have been reduced to nominal damages. The Court
might well have held that because of the minute fraction of a
percent of papers distributed in Montgomery that the New York
Times was not doing business in Alabama and, therefore, could
not be sued in that state. The action should have been
brought in New York.
The Court, however, chose this occasion to enunciate new
law. For more than a century, the Supreme Court had repeat-
edly declared that libel was not protected by the first amend-
ment. The Court did not forthrightly declare that all libel was
protected. Instead it created two new exceptions to the law of
defamation: first, the law as applied to public officials-later
expanded to include public figures-is different from the law
applicable to all others; and second, with respect to pubic
figures, the plaintiff must prove that a defamatory statement,
19891
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even if untrue, was made with "actual malice." 22 Thus the old
law of defamation, as rewritten by the United States Supreme
Court in New York Times v. Sullivan, was stated by the Court as
follows:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal
rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages
for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct
unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual
malice"-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
23
Justices Black and Douglas in their concurring opinion
stated that in their views "the Times and the individual defend-
ants had an absolute, unconditional constitutional right to
publish in the Time advertisement their criticisms of the Mont-
gomery agencies and officials." 24 Justice Goldberg, joined by
Justice Douglas, objected to the actual malice standard stating,
"[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution
afford to the citizen and to the press an absolute, uncondi-
tional privilege to criticize official conduct. ... 25
One of the unintended consequences of this decision was to
fuel the impetus to sue for libel. For almost two centuries civil
libel had been an anachronism, but a relatively harmless one
because very few persons did bring libel actions. Those who
did had reason to regret it. For example, Alger Hiss. Had he
not sued Whittaker Chambers for libel, against the advice of
his lawyer friends, he would never have been convicted of per-
jury. Harold Laski bitterly resented his unsuccessful libel suit
based on a charge that he "advocated revolution." Even those
who won recovered small verdicts.
As recently as 1947, Professor Zechariah Chafee of the
Harvard Law School wrote:
An able American has too much else to do to waste time on
an expensive libel suit. Most strangers will not believe it,
and his enemies, who will believe it, of course, were against
him before. Anyway, it is just one more blow in the rough-
and-tumble of politics or business. Even if his reputation is
lowered for a while, he can make a fresh start at his home or
in a new region and accomplish enough to overwhelm old
22. Id. at 279-80.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 293.
25. Id. at 298.
[Vol. 15
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scandals. A libeled American prefers to vindicate himself by
steadily pushing forward his career and not by hiring a law-
yer to talk in a courtroom.
26
Today such a sentiment seems to be a quaint reminder of a
far distant time. Now actions for libel are being brought
against cartoonists, restaurant critics, credit companies, con-
sumer reports, biographers, novelists, professors who deny
their colleagues tenure, letter writers, speakers at public meet-
ings, and, of course, the press and electronic media. Following
the Sullivan case, from 1964 to 1986, more than 1029 lower
circuit court decisions involving freedom of speech exclusive
of obscenity have been reported. Countless unreported cases
have been tried and even more have been settled regardless of
the merits to avoid the high cost of litigation. The United
States Supreme Court has rewritten the law of libel in some
seventy decisions during this period. When one considers that
the high court decides at most 160 cases with opinion each
year, this seems to be an inordinate amount of effort devoted
to one small area of law, despite its importance. Defamation
suits along with bankruptcy and mergers have been a growth
industry for the legal profession.
It is not only the number of libel suits, which is enormous,
but also the cost of defense that has a chilling effect on every
one. These lawsuits have been a disaster for both plaintiffs and
defendants, a waste of time for the courts, and have sharply
curtailed the access of the public to information and opinion
that all of us as citizens of a democracy should have. Members
of the media admit that lawyers are now in the editorial rooms
not only of radio and television stations and newspapers but
also book and magazine publishers. Phil Donahue asks, "Is the
press becoming wimpy?" When the average cost of the de-
fense of a libel suit is more than $200,000 even the wealthiest
media giants have to think carefully before airing or publishing
stories. The bottom line cannot be ignored. For many small
newspapers and journals one lawsuit can mean the difference
between bankruptcy and viability.
A few notorious cases reveal the unsatisfactory nature of li-
bel actions since New York Times v. Sullivan. The suit by Gen-
eral Ariel Sharon of Israel against Time magazine consumed
26. Z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS: A REPORT FROM THE
COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 106-07 (1947).
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three months of trial and eleven days ofjury deliberation. The
jury found, in accordance with the judge's instructions, three
separate special verdicts that were returned seriatim (the jury
did not know in advance what the effect of its special verdicts
would be on the outcome of the case-an extraordinary and
unprecedented procedure). The special verdicts the jury had
to answer were: 1) Was the statement in question defamatory?
2) Was it false? 3) Was it made with "actual malice?" The
jury's answers to questions one and two were yes. The answer
to question three was no. A verdict was accordingly entered in
favor of the defendant. The jury, obviously outraged by their
own verdict, volunteered an answer to a question they were
not asked. They found that Time magazine was negligent in
publishing the statement.
In the libel action brought by General William Westmore-
land against CBS and "60 Minutes," after eighteen weeks of
trial and the expenditure by both sides of an estimated six to
ten million dollars, the action was withdrawn.
The suit by Tavoulareas against Mobil Oil which resulted in
a verdict of two million dollars is not yet over. The case of
Herbert v. Lando27 has been in litigation more than fifteen years.
Dickens would have had a field day with libel law except that
in these notorious multimillion dollar cases the parties are not
the poor and downtrodden but the rich and powerful. Poor
people who have been libeled and whose privacy has been bru-
tally invaded cannot afford to sue. And defendants who have
no insurance and are of moderate means must buy off the
plaintiffs at exorbitant amounts.
Libel has always been an action for the rich and important.
Has anyone ever heard of a poor welfare mother suing for libel
because she was falsely accused of bearing children in order to
increase her allotment? Indeed, under English law, stating
that a person was poor was deemed to be libelous per se. A
cursory review of reported libel cases reveals that most plain-
tiffs are well to do and well known persons in their communi-
ties. Many libel defendants are enormously wealthy. In fact,
they are often sued because they have deep pockets. However,
less affluent defendants suffer considerably.
Since my book, A Chilling Effect, was published a year and a
27. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
[Vol. 15
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half ago, I have received letters from many libel plaintiffs and
defendants. One of these defendants who had written a letter
to the Journal of Medical Primatology pointed out that an Austrian
manufacturer of pharmaceuticals planned to establish a re-
search facility in Sierra Leone, West Africa, to use chimpanzees
in research and testing of hepatitis vaccine. She pointed out
the dangers of such a program to the dwindling chimpanzee
population, an endangered species, and the possible perils of
the spread of hepatitis among wild chimpanzees. The com-
pany sued the letter writer, the journal, the editor, and a
number of others. The trial judge denied a motion for a di-
rected verdict and a motion to dismiss. On appeal from this
decision a unanimous court found that the statements in the
letter were true and not defamatory. During the four years be-
tween the filing of suit and the decision of the appellate court
the insurance carrier for the letter writer had paid more than
$200,000 in legal defense costs and settled by paying the plain-
tiff $100,000. Other defendants whose legal costs were simi-
larly enormous also settled for substantial sums.
The amounts of the verdicts, often for many millions, shock
many people. Should hurt feelings and bruised egos be
awarded more than actual physical harm and monetary losses?
Westmoreland, for example, had demanded damages of $120
million. Even though eighty or ninety percent of verdicts in
favor of libel plaintiffs are reversed on appeal, this affords little
protection to hapless defendants who have expended hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars in defense costs. Certainly, from
the viewpoint of the public this is a waste of valuable court
time. From the viewpoint of the trial judge-not an important
consideration, I admit-it is an exercise in futility. No other
field of the law has such a high rate of reversal.
I suggest that all these ills arise not because of the avarice of
the litigants and lawyers, although that factor cannot be dis-
counted, but because of the unsettled state of the law and its
counterintuitive doctrines. First, let us look at a number of the
recent post-Sullivan doctrines that have caused so much diffi-
culty and then consider possible remedies.
The public/private figure test has been productive of much
litigation and many decisions that would strike most people as
grossly unfair. Sullivan, you will recall, was a public official. It
is easy to decide in advance of suit whether or not the plaintiff
is a public official. But who can know whether or not he or she
1989]
11
Forer: Libel, Privacy and the First Amendment
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1989
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
is a public figure? Gertz, a lawyer in private practice, was
falsely accused by the John Birch publication of being a Lenin-
ist and a communist fronter. A jury awarded him $50,000.
Clearly the statement was false and defamatory and caused
harm. The court set aside the verdict because there was no
proof of "actual malice." The Supreme Court, holding that he
was not a public figure, remanded for a new trial.28 Although
Gertz ultimately recovered almost a decade later, consider the
result if he had also been an unpaid member of a school board
or held some other part-time public office, as many lawyers do.
The harm to him would have been at least as great, possibly
greater because he might have lost his public office. And yet
because there was no proof that the publisher acted with "ac-
tual malice" he would be denied recovery. In the Sharon case,
when the jury volunteered its finding that Time magazine was
negligent, they were clearly indicating their dissatisfaction with
the actual malice test and their preference for the usual fault
standard of negligence. Negligence is the time honored stan-
dard for liability in civil cases other than libel. It has func-
tioned successfully for several centuries. But in just twenty-
five years the actual malice standard has provoked a storm of
criticism and widespread dissatisfaction.
For illustrations of the manifest unfairness of this standard
let us look at several United States Supreme Court decisions.
The mayor of Ocala, Florida who was running for re-election
was falsely and negligently accused of having a criminal record.
Just before the election, the local paper published an article
stating that the mayor had a criminal record. The mayor lost
the election and sued the paper for libel. At trial the defendant
admitted that the statement was false. It was the mayor's
brother who had a criminal record. Five minutes of investiga-
tion would have revealed the truth. But the Supreme Court
reversed a verdict in favor of the unfortunate mayor because
the publisher acted without "actual malice."-2 9
On the other hand, Mary Alice Firestone, the ex-wife of the
heir to the Firestone millions, recovered $100,000 in a libel
action against Time magazine for a brief item reporting her di-
28. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 324 (1974).
29. Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1971).
[Vol. 15
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vorce. This verdict was upheld by the Supreme Court. 30 Time
magazine had reported correctly the fact of the divorce, but
stated that it was on the grounds of adultery. The decision of
the Court was unclear. She had been sued for adultery and the
local papers had carried lurid accounts of the evidence. How-
ever, by examining the law of Florida, the Court concluded
that the divorce could not have been granted on that ground.
Since she was a purely private figure, Time magazine could not
claim the protection of the "actual malice" rule. The test of a
public figure is one who thrusts him or herself into the public
eye. By her own flagrant actions this plaintiff had thrust her-
self into public notice. Nonetheless, the Court held that she
was not a public figure. Therefore, she could recover in libel
even though the reporter was probably not negligent.
But, compare the case of the Hill family. They were the vic-
tims of a brutal crime that was so disrupting to their lives that
they moved to another community to avoid being reminded of
their ordeal. The crime was widely reported at the time. Of
course, it was news. The incident was also the basis of a fic-
tionalized play, The Desperate Hours. The Hills did not sue the
dramatist. But when Time magazine ran a story stating that the
play was a factual re-enactment of the crime involving the
Hills, they did sue. The article was admittedly false. The play
was not factual; it was fictional. The article was not defama-
tory. However, the reopening of this painful incident to the
public certainly invaded their privacy. The trial court found
for the Hills. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that they
were public figures. 3' While they may have been public figures
at the time of the crime and shortly thereafter, they had not
been public figures before and certainly not after the lapse of
several years. Again, the common sense question to have
asked would have been, was the magazine negligent in not in-
vestigating whether the play was fact or fiction. I believe the
reporter was clearly negligent and that the Hills should have
recovered.
Countless rape victims find themselves not only victims of
criminals but also victims of the legal system. Long after the
crime has been reported and the offender tried, the victim has
30. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976). The Court remanded to state
court for determination of fault, refusing to review the damage award. Id. at 461.
31. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 375 (1967).
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to relive the ordeal when some reporter or producer of a
docudrama decides to resurrect the incident.
In a particularly heartless case, a young girl was brutally
raped. The case was widely reported at the time but none of
the media gave the victim's name, a practice that is voluntarily
adhered to by most responsible journalists. Some time later
when the victim was dead the matter was again reported, this
time giving the victim's name. Her family sued. The Supreme
Court denied recovery, holding that she was a public figure.
3 2
The actual malice standard which was designed to protect
first amendment rights is not only unfair to plaintiffs who are
denied recovery for serious harms but also to the defendants.
In order to prove "actual malice," i.e., the state of mind of the
editor, producer or publisher, the plaintiff is entitled to the
most searching discovery. Notes of meetings of reporters and
editors, preliminary drafts, outtakes of television shows and
any scrap of paper, tape, or film that bears on what was in the
mind of the defendant must be produced. This violates the
privacy of the defendant and puts the lawyer in the editorial
room where, I submit, lawyers do not belong. Of course, such
lengthy and time consuming discovery escalates the costs of
trial. And the jury is forced to base its decision on what is es-
sentially not a provable fact.
While much of the publicity with respect to libel and privaty
suits has been focused on the reporting of news, Sullivan has
affected fiction, biography, humor, and commercial speech.
All have been subjected to the doctrines spawned by Sullivan
with little analysis of the different interests affected and imper-
illed. These decisions have had the much deplored chilling ef-
fect on freedom of expression which the Supreme Court
declared it wanted to prevent.
Many of these decisions appear to laypersons and a number
of lawyers to be bizarre. For example, the author of a novel
describing nude psychotherapy found herself sued by a nude
psychotherapist. The doctor who claimed to be affronted by
the novel did not prove that he suffered any damage. It was
admitted that the book was a novel which, by definition, is a
work of imagination, not factual reporting. The therapist in
the novel bore not the slightest physical resemblance to the
32. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975).
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plaintiff and had a different name. The plaintiff is but one of
many nude therapists and this modality of treatment is not
copyrightable or otherwise exclusively his property or unique
to him. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court refused to review a
substantial verdict in his favor.33
Those who admittedly write about real people are in great
jeopardy. Take Joe McGinnis who wrote Fatal Vision, a best
selling biography of Captain Jeffrey MacDonald who was con-
victed of murdering his pregnant wife and two children. The
book was made into a popular television show. MacDonald
had entered into a contract with McGinnis under which, in re-
turn for forty percent of the royalties, MacDonald would coop-
erate with the author who retained control of the manuscript.
When the author reached the conclusion that MacDonald was
guilty, MacDonald sued. Even though by contract as well as
common law and the first amendment, an author has a right to
express his opinion, the case was not dismissed. McGinnis had
to sue his publisher's insurance carrier to compel the carrier to
defend the law suit. McGinnis won that round but lost a subse-
quent suit to recoup from the carrier his legal expenses in suc-
cessfully compelling the carrier to provide his defense.
Despite the popularity of the book, legal costs have probably
exceeded McGinnis' substantial earnings. After there was a
hung jury, McGinnis paid MacDonald more than $300,000 to
settle the suit. Apparently the federal government is not pur-
suing its claim to confiscate profits from crime under the fed-
eral crimes code.
Biographers have fared even worse. Antoni Gronowicz
wrote a biography of Pope John Paul that had a fulsome intro-
duction by Cardinal Krol of Pennsylvania. Gronowicz was
criminally prosecuted by the federal government for mail fraud
on the theory that some of the statements in the book, particu-
larly his claims as to the numbers of times he had interviewed
the Pope, were false. The Third Circuit upheld the govern-
ment's right to prosecute and ruled that the first amendment
did not protect the hapless author.34 As a trial judge I won-
dered how the defendant would subpoena the Pope and
whether the court would compel the Pope to submit to inter-
33. Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (Cal. Ct. App.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
34. In re Gran Jury Matter, Antoni Gronowicz, 764 F.2d 983 (3rd Cir. 1985).
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rogatories and depositions. The trial of this case would have
presented more difficulties than the prosecution of Colonel
North. Fortunately for the government, the author died
before trial was scheduled.
Movie star Elizabeth Taylor sued to prevent production of a
docudrama about her life claiming a right of publicity and that
she was a private figure. If anyone in recent years has thrust
herself into the public eye, it is certainly Elizabeth Taylor. Her
multiple marriages, her illnesses, and her dieting have been
widely reported. But the court gave preference to the com-
mercial claims of Taylor over the constitutional rights of the
producer. At the opposite end of the spectrum isJ.D. Salinger,
the obsessively reclusive author of Catcher in the Rye. Certainly
the author of a modern classic that has been required reading
in many high schools and colleges for more than a generation
should be unable to claim that he is a purely private figure.
Salinger objected to quotations from his letters, which letters
the biographer had found in a library. Publication of the book
was enjoined. This ruling reversed decades of law which held
that prior restraint of publication in the absence of a clear and
present danger is unconstitutional. What danger could Salin-
ger be exposed to except unfavorable publicity or invasion of
privacy? The remedy for such harms, if provable, is an action
for civil damages. Salinger quickly copyrighted his letters after
the biography was written but before the court of appeals de-
cided the case. The Supreme Court denied certiorari, the ef-
fect of which was again to give protection to financial interest
over first amendment rights.3 5 Salinger's possible property in-
terest in the belatedly copyrighted material was held to over-
ride the freedom of the press.
Defenders of the Supreme Court can point with satisfaction
to the decision in the Hustler case3 6 holding that obvious par-
ody cannot be the subject of an action for emotional distress.
This is one of only a very few cases since Sullivan in which first
amendment rights were unequivocally upheld.
This confusion of commercial interests with free speech is
another distressing aspect of the post-Sullivan cases. In a
35. Salinger v. Random House, 650 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd and re-
manded, 811 F.2d 90 (2nd Cir. 1987), rehk'g denied, 818 F.2d 252 (2nd Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 213 (1987).
36. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988).
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number of astonishing decisions the first amendment has, I
suggest, been misapplied. The case of Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc. y3 illustrates this trend. This case arose
out of an admitted error in a credit report. It was tried and
decided under legal principles enunciated in New York Times v.
Sullivan and its progeny.
The facts are simple and uncontested. Dun & Bradstreet er-
roneously informed five of its regular customers that plaintiff
had filed a voluntary petition of bankruptcy. That error was
committed by a seventeen-year-old high school student em-
ployed by defendant. Apparently no one checked his work.
Many judges would have treated this as a commercial case. De-
fendant was clearly negligent. Plaintiff should have recovered
whatever losses it incurred as a result of the dissemination of
the erroneous information. Under this doctrine, a jury would
have been instructed that if the defendant was grossly negli-
gent and acted with reckless disregard for the rights of the
plaintiff, punitive damages could be awarded in the discretion
of the jury in order to punish defendant for its conduct and to
deter future gross negligence. In awarding punitive damages,
the jury would be permitted to consider the defendant's assets,
but the award would have to bear some relationship to the ac-
tual damages. For example, if a plaintiff could prove that it
probably lost a contract on which it would have made a profit
of $10,000, it would recover $10,000 in compensatory dam-
ages. An award perhaps of $20,000 in punitive damages would
not be unreasonable.
Because the complaint alleged libel, this simple case that
could have been tried in two or three days bedeviled the trial
judge, the Vermont Supreme Court, and nine justices of the
Supreme Court. They labored mightily and brought forth not
a mouse but a three-headed monster.
The jury returned a verdict of $50,000 in presumed damages
and $300,000 in punitive damages. The Vermont Supreme
Court upheld the verdict. It concluded that the precatory lan-
guage with respect to punitive damages in Gertz was applicable
only to media defendants. Justice Powell, writing for a plural-
ity of the Supreme Court consisting of himself and Justices
Rehnquist and O'Connor, held that matters not of "public
concern" are entitled to "reduced" first amendment protec-
37. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
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tions. Although public concern had been mentioned in prior
cases it had not been a critical test of liability. Chief Justice
Burger and Justice White concurred but urged that both the
Gertz and Sullivan cases be reexamined. The clear implication
is that they would like to overrule these decisions. Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented, pointing
out the difficulties in using a test of "public issues" or "public
concern" and the fact that each future case would have to be
decided by the trial courts on an ad hoc basis.
Although there was not a scintilla of evidence that the plain-
tiff had suffered any losses, a verdict of $50,000 in presumed
damages and $300,000 in punitive damages was upheld.
In another case the Supreme Court held that congressional
restrictions on the amount of money that candidates can spend
on their political campaigns violates the first amendment.
3 8
The dissenters bitterly complained that adopting a view that
"money talks" is simplistic.
Is there a way out of this morass? I believe there is a com-
paratively simple and direct solution-a federal statute gov-
erning the law of libel and privacy.
It has taken the Supreme Court more than a quarter of a
century to confuse the law of libel and privacy. It will take at
least that long to undo the harm that has been done. No court
can write a blueprint for an entire body of law; that is a task for
the legislature. Courts are limited to deciding cases and con-
troversies. These arise in an aleatory fashion. Frequently the
facts are anomalous. Much of the present difficulty has arisen
because of the blind use of precedent in dissimilar cases.
The idea of a statute has gained popularity in the past year.
"Annenberg Washington," an institute of Northwestern Uni-
versity devoted to communications policy studies, established
a task force to study the problem of libel.39 It included lawyers
for libel plaintiffs and for libel defendants, academicians, jour-
nalists, a representative of the insurance industry and a judge.
There was a general agreement on the part of all participants
that the present state of the law is unsatisfactory and that an
appropriate solution was a statute. Some favored a state stat-
ute on an experimental basis, others a federal statute.
38. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
39. Proposal for the Reform of Libel Law: Report of the Libel Reform Project of the An-
nenberg Washington Program (1988).
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I believe that a federal statute is preferable. Most of the
print and electronic media do business in more than one state.
Almost all books and periodicals are published on a national
basis. Even regional and local papers frequently are sold
across state lines. The entire communications industry is en-
gaged in interstate commerce. Therefore, it should be gov-
erned by federal law. At present ingenious plaintiffs search the
laws of the fifty states looking for the most favorable jurisdic-
tion even though neither the plaintiff nor the defendant resides
there. Defendants have had to defend suits in States in which
they were never physically present. This blatant jurisdiction
hopping also adds to the cost of litigation and unduly burdens
many courts.
There was general agreement at Annenberg Washington
that one statute should cover all actions for defamation, libel,
libel per quod, right of publicity, and similar claims. It was
unanimously agreed that both presumed and punitive damages
be abolished and that compensatory damages be proved by
clear and convincing evidence. There was also agreement that
apology, reply, and retraction should be made much easier and
that a demand for retraction or reply should be a condition
precedent to any action for libel.
The Annenberg group also favored, as I do, a provision im-
munizing what is called neutral reportage. If a publication or a
speaker correctly reports the views expressed by another, that
is neutral reporting. It would protect publications that print
letters to the editor and accurate reports of speeches and other
publications with attribution. Incidentally, if such a law had
been in effect in 1964, Sullivan's suit against the New York Times
would have been dismissed.
Some academicians favored a declaratory judgment in lieu of
an action for damages. However, it was the consensus at a
public meeting of journalists and media lawyers that plaintiffs
who assert a claim for damages should be entitled to recover
for provable harm and not be limited to a declaratory
judgment.
There was also profound dissatisfaction with the actual mal-
ice standard and the difficulties in trial that it generates. I also
favor a statutory provision tightening the distinction between
fact and opinion so that initially on a motion for directed ver-
dict the judge can make that crucial decision.
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The participants also agreed that the law has worked great
hardship on small publications and has contributed substan-
tially to the "blanding" of the press. I also favor a clear decla-
ration, contrary to recent decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, 40 that the public's right to know be given stat-
utory recognition.
Drafting a statute, particularly in a sensitive area of the law
in which competing constitutional rights are at issue, will not
be an easy task. The Annenberg group made an admirable be-
ginning effort in less than a year. I believe that if Congress
were to consider the subject and hold committee hearings that
a more rational and workable law could be enacted.
More than two centuries ago, the great English jurist, Lord
Mansfield, wrote, "Whenever a man publishes, he publishes at
his peril." That chilling statement has never been more true
than today. In our dangerous world where all of us face the
perils of nuclear annihilation, destruction of the ozone layer,
and all the complex problems of the global village, the public
needs more information and more robust and uninhibited dis-
cussion. We also need the intellectual stimulation of arts and
literature that are not censored either by government or by the
omnipresent fear of a crippling libel suit. It is time for the
Congress to act.
40. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
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